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ABSTRACT 
The Nevada Test Site (NTS) has successfully completed a multi-year effort to characterize and 
ship 1860 legacy transuranic (TRU) waste drums for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 
(WIPP), a permanent TRU disposal site.  This has been a cooperative effort among the 
U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office 
(NNSA/NSO), the U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field Office (DOE/CBFO), the NTS 
Management and Operations (M&O) contractor Bechtel Nevada (BN), and various contractors 
under the Central Characterization Project (CCP) umbrella.  The success is due primarily to the 
diligence, perseverance, and hard work of each of the contractors, the DOE/CBFO, and 
NNSA/NSO, along with the support of the U.S. Department of Energy, Headquarters (DOE/HQ).  
This paper presents, from an NTS perspective, the challenges and successes of utilizing the CCP 
for obtaining a certified characterization program, sharing responsibilities for characterization, 
data validation, and loading of TRU waste with BN to achieve disposal at WIPP from a Small 
Quantity Site (SQS) such as the NTS.  
 
The challenges in this effort arose from two general sources.  First, the arrangement of 
DOE/CBFO contractors under the CCP performing work and certifying waste at the NTS within 
a Hazard Category 2 (HazCat 2) non-reactor nuclear facility operated by BN, presented difficult 
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challenges.  The nuclear safety authorization basis, safety liability and responsibility, conduct of 
operations, allocation and scheduling of resources, and other issues were particularly demanding.  
The program-level and field coordination needed for the closely interrelated characterization 
tasks was extensive and required considerable effort by all parties.   
 
The second source of challenge was the legacy waste itself.  None of the waste was generated at 
the NTS.  The waste was generated at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL), Lynchburg, Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site 
(RFETS), and a variety of other sites over 20 years ago, making the development of Acceptable 
Knowledge a significant and problematic effort.  In addition, the characterization requirements, 
and data quality objectives for shipment and WIPP disposal today, were non-existent when this 
waste was generated, resulting in real-time adjustments to unexpected conditions.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to present the Nevada Test Site (NTS) perspective on the use of the 
Central Characterization Project (CCP) to disposition transuranic (TRU) waste from Small 
Quantity Sites (SQSs).  Some of the NTS challenges are comparable to future challenges at other 
SQSs and major U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites using CCP.  Some challenges are only 
applicable to characterization and loading operations within a radiological or HazCat 2 facility, 
and some are unique to NTS TRU characterization and loading.   
 
The NTS has successfully completed a multi-year effort to characterize and ship 1860 legacy 
TRU Waste drums for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).  Characterization 
began in 2001 [1].  This has been a cooperative effort among the U.S. Department of Energy, 
National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO), the 
U.S. Department of Energy Carlsbad Field Office (DOE/CBFO), the NTS Management and 
Operations (M&O) contractor Bechtel Nevada (BN), and various contractors under the CCP 
umbrella.   
 
The success of the project is due primarily to the diligence, perseverance, and hard work of each 
of the contractors, the DOE/CBFO, and NNSA/NSO, along with the continued support of the 
U.S. Department of Energy, Headquarters (DOE/HQ).  Significant and noteworthy contributions 
were made on a frequent basis by federal employees and contractors alike.   
 
The challenges in this effort arose from two general sources.  First, the integration of BN and the 
contractors under the CCP to achieve WIPP-compliant characterization and loading within a 
Hazard Category 2 (HazCat 2) non-reactor nuclear facility at the NTS was very difficult.  Major 
challenges were addressed in roles and responsibilities, safety authorization basis, safety liability 
and responsibility, conduct of operations, allocation and scheduling of resources and other issues.  
The program-level and field coordination needed for the closely interrelated characterization 
tasks was extensive and required considerable effort by all parties.  Integral to this effort was 
close cooperation between NNSA/NSO and DOE/CBFO.   
 
Second, the legacy TRU waste presented significant challenges due to the numerous generators, 
the range and poor documentation of the generating activities, and the age of the waste.  Very 
little of the waste was generated at the NTS.  The waste was generated at Lawrence Livermore 
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National Laboratory (LLNL), Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL), Lynchburg, and Rocky 
Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) among a variety of other sites.  Most of the waste 
was generated over 20 years ago.  The quality assurance rigor required in today’s waste 
management environment was nonexistent when this waste was generated.  This lack of quality 
data made the development of Acceptable Knowledge documentation a significant and 
problematic effort.  It also led to “moments of discovery” throughout the process resulting in 
real-time adjustments to cost and schedule from unexpected conditions.   
 
The NTS experience of using the CCP to disposition TRU waste to WIPP is unique and was 
based on the strength of the waste program at the NTS (how much could be done on site); the 
volume and type of wastes to be processed, and the availability of funded resources.  The 
decision for SQSs to use the CCP was encouraged by DOE/HQ and DOE/CBFO to make 
characterization of small quantities of waste more cost efficient for the complex. 
 
This paper will not attempt to delineate the complete WIPP characterization process nor the 
entire chronicle of the NTS experience.  It will present a brief overview of NTS TRU operations 
and the integrated team that processed the waste.  This will be followed by a synopsis of 
challenges and how well or poorly they were handled, and potential considerations for other 
SQSs, using CCP to help deliver their TRU to WIPP.   
 
OVERVIEW OF NTS TRU CHARACTERIZATION AND LOADING 
The Nevada Test Site 
The NTS is a remote site that is buffered for public access by vast, federally owned land masses. 
A unique national resource, the NTS is a massive outdoor laboratory and national experimental 
center that cannot be duplicated.  Larger than the state of Rhode Island, its it is approximately 
1,375 square miles (3,561 square kilometers or 880,000 acres), make this one of the largest 
secured areas in the United States. The NTS is located in southern Nevada about 65 miles (105 
kilometers) northwest of Las Vegas. The site varies from 28-35 miles (45-56 kilometers) in 
width (east-west) and from 40-55 miles (64-88 kilometers) in length (north-south). The NTS is 
bordered on three sides by the Nevada Test and Training Range, another federally owned, 
restricted area. This restricted area provides a buffer zone to the north and east between the test 
area and land that is open to the public. The combination of the Nevada Test and Training Range 
and the NTS is one of the largest unpopulated land areas in the United States, comprising some 
5,470 square miles (14,200 square kilometers).  
 
TRU Waste Management Operations 
TRU waste is managed at the NTS within the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex 
(RWMC).  The TRU facilities consist of the Waste Examination Facility (WEF), the TRU Pad, 
and the TRU Pad Cover Building (TPCB).  The WEF is comprised of the Visual Examination 
and Repackaging Building (VERB), the Drum Holding Area, Sprung Instant Structure (SIS) for 
headspace gas sampling and thermal conditioning of drums, and an area for vendor (CCP) 
characterization trailers.  For long-term storage, the NTS utilizes the TRU Pad and the TPCB.  
The TPCB is a high-clearance, bermed, fabric-covered frame structure without electric lighting 
or an HVAC system.  The TRU Pad hosts an outdoor area for loading trailer-mounted 
TRUPACT-II containers using the CCP Mobile Loading Unit (MLU). 
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Originally, all TRU facilities were categorized as radiological facilities.  Starting in 2003, all 
TRU operations (including characterization and loading) within the RWMC were conducted 
under a Area 5 Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and the associated Technical Safety 
Requirements (TSR) for TRU activities compliant with 10 Code of Federal Regulations 830 
Subparts A and B (10CFR830).  All TRU facilities are currently operated as HazCat 2 non-
reactor nuclear facilities, with the exception of the VERB.  Due to the construction, age, and 
history of the VERB, it was difficult and time/cost prohibitive to develop a determination that the 
VERB had the requisite structural rigor as a HazCat 2 facility to mitigate the seismic risk in the 
geographic area.  Therefore, the VERB is operated as a Hazard Category 3, non-reactor nuclear 
facility, with limited allowable radioactive inventory.  
 
The CCP Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) unit and the Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) unit 
are trailer-mounted mobile units operated as segments of the WEF, under the DSA, with specific 
controls and individual radioactive inventory limits.  The units were used to characterize 
55-gallon drums.  The NDE unit was used to visually represent the drum contents (by shape) to 
provide data to assure conformation with the Waste Stream Profile and identify prohibited items 
for removal in the glovebox.  The NDA unit was used to develop a radioactive isotopic inventory 
of the drum.  The NDE and NDA units are also referred to respectively as the Real-Time 
Radiography (RTR) and Segmented Gamma Scanner (SGS) units.   
 
The CCP Headspace Gas Sampling (HSGS) unit was installed in the SIS and used to pull 
headspace gas samples for volatile organic compounds (hydrogen and methane analysis) through 
the drum lid.  The drill assembly in an explosive-proof chamber of the unit was also used to 
perforate unvented drum lids and install a filtered vent.  Commonly, drums were vented, placed 
back in storage to meet Drum Aging Criteria (DAC), and reprocessed in the unit to obtain a gas 
sample.  The remaining area in the SIS was used to store drums in a temperature controlled 
environment for the requisite thermal conditioning prior to sampling.   
 
In addition to the drill assembly in the HSGS unit, a pneumatic driver attached to the drum lid, 
and activated by a corded pendant switch, was used to safely install a combination sample port 
and filter vent.  Use of this system was a time-saving practice when the HSGS was unavailable 
or a headspace gas sample was not needed.  While the optional remote control switch could not 
be used due to competing radio frequencies from nearby U.S. Air Force activities, the corded 
switch allowed the unit to be safely operated from a distance, to mitigate the effects to workers 
from a potential deflagration or explosive event. 
 
Within the VERB, BN operates a glovebox capable of handling input and output of 55 and 85 gal 
drums.  This glovebox has a split design allowing drum repackaging to occur on one side, while 
segregated items are safely stored on the other side.   It features 14 sets of glove ports, high-
efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration and negative pressure, a CO2 fire suppression system 
to extinguish Class A fires, a drum lifting mechanism and port for introducing 55-gallon and 
85-gallon drums to the glovebox, and a material exit port to a 55-gallon drum.  A full audio and 
video system was installed to record glovebox operations.  The glovebox is contained within a 
Secondary Containment Structure (SCS) room that provides additional and separate HEPA 
filtration and negative pressure.  The SCS is used as secondary containment for glovebox 
operations and for TRU open container evolutions that do not require the glovebox. 
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The glovebox was used to verify the NDE results on a statistical population of drums, to perform 
physical verification of the drum contents in lieu of NDE, and for prohibited item removal (PIR).  
NDE, NDA, HSG, and VE together comprise the needed activities to characterize drums for 
disposal, in accordance with the WIPP Waste acceptance Criteria and the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act permit for the WIPP disposal site. 
 
The field processes were staffed by the respective owners of the resources: the individual CCP 
contractors staffed the NDE, NDA, and HSGS processes; BN staffed the VERB glovebox.  BN 
provided drum handling, Radiological Control Technicians (RCTs), drum storage, maintenance, 
calibration, and typical facility support functions.   
 
Organizational Roles and Responsibilities 
The integrated organizational roles and responsibilities specific to corporate structure, nuclear 
operations, and safety management were developed for this work based on three interrelated 
needs. First, an agreed-to corporate structure to identify who would be responsible for which 
functions and who could authorize work was required.  Work authorization was established 
through work-scope agreements between BN and NNSA/NSO and among DOE/CBFO and the 
CCP contractors through the CCP integration contractor, Washington TRU Solutions (WTS).  
BN and WTS formalized their working relationship with a Memorandum of Understanding, an 
Interface Agreement, and a Statement of Work   
 
Second, all parties needed to maintain and adhere to the rigorous conduct-of-operations protocols 
required for operations within nuclear facilities.  BN, as the facility manager, held the primary 
responsibility for nuclear facility safety while each contractor held responsibility for the safety of 
their employees.   
 
Finally, the NTS had responsibilities as the waste owner and data generator for Visual 
Examination and Prohibited Item removal in the very prescriptive WIPP certification and 
shipping protocols.  All characterization data is the responsibility of the NTS as the waste owner.  
The CCP, as the WIPP certification holder and shipping coordinator, held primary responsibility 
for meeting the characterization requirements under the CCP certified waste characterization 
program.  The roles and responsibilities structure for these last two needs was accomplished 
through modification of BN and CCP procedures, identification of key positions within the 
Interface Agreement, and development of co-signed procedures held by both BN and CCP.   
 
CHALLENGES 
The challenges in this effort arose from two general sources: the integration of BN and the 
contractors under the CCP, and the legacy TRU waste itself. 
 
The challenges presented here may be generic to any site where the M&O contractor is working 
with CCP contractors to achieve certification of TRU waste for disposal at WIPP.  The degree of 
difficulty in many cases, however, is specific to the NTS.  For instance, a site where CCP 
provides all of the characterization functions will have fewer integration issues with the 
certification process (although the M&O still has responsibilities as the waste generator) and 
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lessened operational complexity than the NTS, but these will still be challenges requiring 
attention by the M&O, CCP, and DOE.   
 
Integration 
Roles and Responsibilities  
The roles and responsibilities are intricate and this complexity is compounded by the lack of a 
single contractual document that links the participating contractors and DOE offices.  The effort 
and cost of interfaces is easily underestimated and is the single most important key to 
successfully shipping TRU waste to WIPP.  BN and CCP entered into zero-sum contracts, a 
Memorandum of Understanding, an Interface Agreement, a Statement of Work, and 
comprehensive cross-contractor procedures to establish the necessary flow of communication, 
authority, and accountability among contractors.   
 
Clear decision and communication protocols were also needed between NNSA/NSO (that has 
oversight for BN at the NTS) and DOE/CBFO (that holds the CCP contract and schedules WIPP 
shipments).  Frequent involvement by NNSA/NSO with DOE/CBFO and DOE/HQ was a 
significant contribution to the success of the project.   
 
Safety and Safety Liability  
Safety is the responsibility of everyone involved with the project.  As the M&O, BN shared the 
responsibility and liability for CCP operations in a dual role with CCP.  Safety liability for CCP 
operations cannot be deflected to CCP only.  This was a difficult challenge.  BN needed to 
maintain the strong Integrated Safety Management (ISM) structure that has resulted to date in 
over seven million hours without a Lost Time Accident.  CCP needed to retain control of safety 
for its personnel and equipment at the NTS.  To accomplish these objectives, a dual concurrence 
was required on all documents and procedures involving the performance of field work, and a 
zero-sum contract was signed establishing CCP as a subcontractor to BN to give CCP status 
within the ISM structure for safety and work control documents in place at the NTS.   
 
Authorization Basis 
CCP TRU waste characterization activities were performed under site safety authorization basis 
(AB) documents at the NTS.   During the initial campaign, only a limited number of containers 
were available for characterization at each facility due to activity limits for a radiological facility.  
Operating as a radiological facility was not a cost effective way to manage the characterization 
activities at the NTS based on the TRU inventory at the NTS.  BN implemented a new DSA with 
associated TSR, compliant with 10CFR830, and re-categorized the TRU facilities as HazCat 2/3 
radioactive non-reactor nuclear facilities.  The CCP equipment was demobilize to other sites 
while the NTS implemented the new DSA resulting in a break in characterization episodes.  CCP 
processes were required to undergo formal Management Self Assessments and graded 
Operational Readiness Reviews to demonstrate compliance with the new AB, a challenge that 
was overlooked until deployment for the next campaign.  Part of the characterization production 
gap between January 2003 and May 2004 is attributed to the effort by both BN and CCP to 
implement the new DSA (Figure 1).  Also shown in Figure 1 is a significant increase in the 
overall number of characterization actions per quarter (after implementation of the new DSA) 
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due largely to the increase in allowable radioactive material limits, as the TRU facilities 
transitioned from radiological facilities to HazCat 2 facilities. 
 
The TSR for TRU activities also evoked stringent controls on training, maintenance, in-service 
inspections, equipment specifications, testing and modifications, procurement, and other 
requirements that CCP was mandated to follow to perform compliant operations.  For example, 
CCP personnel were required to take DSA training.  The CCP training program was measured 
against the training program requirements in the DSA.  Maintenance interfaces were evaluated 
and placed in the Interface Document.  This had a significant cost-and-schedule impact.   
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field, BN dedicated two full-time people and CCP dedicated one person at the NTS and one in 
Carlsbad to coordinate the interrelated field processes.   In addition, four to five people at BN, 
CCP, and NNSA/NSO spent about one-half of their time to coordinate logistics in support of 
field work.  In addition to attending a general Plan of the Day meeting of Area 5 operations, a 
separate TRU field operations meeting was held daily, and a weekly joint teleconference was 
held between the CCP and BN offices and their field personnel.  Notwithstanding these efforts, 
Figure 1 shows a high degree of variability in the number of characterization actions over time.   
In an optimal production environment, it would be advantageous to complete a characterization 
evolution for the entire population on drums before continuing, or at least to develop a stockpile 
of drums that have been through one process and are waiting for another.  It would also be 
helpful to always process drums sequentially (e.g., RTR to PIR to NDA to headspace gas 
sampling to VE).   
 
At the NTS, stockpiling was achieved, to some degree, but the characterization operation was 
often in a “just in time” delivery mode from one process to another.  The NTS starting TRU 
inventory (about 1600 drums) was relatively small compared to major sites with thousands of 
drums, which allow the characterization processes to operate relatively independent of each other.  
Many SQSs will have even smaller quantities of drums than the NTS.  
 
Another element to “just in time” delivery is the interrelated nature of the processes. For instance, 
a drum needing headspace gas sampling needs to be closed longer than the DAC time.  The DAC 
clock cannot start until after the PIR evolution is completed.  The PIR determination is based on 
the RTR data.  The RTR might not be done until the NDA analysis determines the radioisotope 
inventory.  Unvented drums are not permitted in the NDA unit, so the NDA of the drum may not 
have been started until the drum was vented in the HSGS unit.  The permutations on this 
example were numerous at the NTS and were further compounded by the removal of large 
percentages of the drum contents during PIR or repackaging, causing the NDA and HSGS 
process to be redone (See Rejected and Rerun Drums).   
 
Finally, discoveries were made that were adverse to characterization production.  Drums 
scheduled for characterization fell out, due to less than TRU radioisotope limits during NDA.  
Unacceptable Volatile Organic Compound (VOC) and hydrogen limits were reported during 
HSGS analysis.  Poor drum integrity was discovered as drums were inspected in storage prior to 
movement to the characterization venues.  Surface exposure levels were recorded making drums 
Remote Handled (by the WIPP definition) rather than Contact Handled.  Prohibited items or 
contents incompatible with the Waste Stream (prohibited from disposal at WIPP) discovered 
during RTR were also in evidence.  There were critical equipment failures, since much of the 
equipment represented a single-point failure for the process, as will be common at other SQSs.   
 
Scheduled maintenance required several days at the glovebox, which resulted in a lack of 
feedstock for the other processes.  Duplication of systems and readily available spare parts would 
have been helpful in keeping critical systems in top working order, but this is not always possible 
or cost effective. There were some lapses by the team in early identification of a pending 
problem with keeping feedstock for the processes.  All of these “discoveries,” whether 
preventable or not, resulted in less than optimal characterization throughput. 
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To summarize this challenge, characterization was successfully completed with a high level of 
integration and cooperation among all parties; however, efficiency and productivity could have 
been enhanced.  While more of these problems could have been mitigated through better 
management of maintenance, training, replicate systems, thermal conditioning, and drum-aging 
criteria, some of the work inefficiencies are simply a function of small quantities of available 
drums in inventory that do not allow stockpiling of feedstock for interrelated processes. 
 
Shared Federal Resources 
SQSs must be adaptable to change in the nationally controlled resources.  DOE sites with large 
quantities of TRU waste often have priority in completing DOE commitments that necessitate 
changes in availability of characterization and shipping resources.  At the NTS when CCP 
resources were unavailable, some field personnel were shifted to other tasks within the Waste 
Management scope (primarily Low Level Waste disposal operations) and other tasks at the NTS.  
However, the cost of project overhead and maintaining facilities and core capabilities in a state 
of readiness with respect to training, maintenance, inspections, and other tasks required by the 
TSR for the facilities continued to be incurred.  Some of the gap in characterization production 
between January 2003 and May 2004, and the shipping delay until November 2005 for drums 
certified in September 2005, was due to lack of resources.  Conversely, CCP resources were 
sometimes held at the NTS to the detriment of characterization at other sites.   
 
Acceptable Knowledge 
Acceptable Knowledge (AK) documents developed to the requisite strength required by the 
WIPP guidelines are a significant and time-consuming part of the characterization process.  The 
AK document starts as a historical record of the waste, but must be amended to include new 
information from the characterization activities, if the data conflicts with or is omitted from the 
existing document.  The legacy waste at the NTS was generated at LLNL, LBL, Lynchburg, 
RFETS, and a variety of other sites over 20 years ago, making the development of AK a 
significant and problematic effort.  The disposal requirements for TRU waste and quality 
assurance rigor required in today’s environment were non-existent at the time the waste was 
generated, resulting in real-time adjustments to unexpected conditions and many changes to the 
AK documents.  The most notable adjustments were the changes in the definition of 
homogeneous solids for the S3900 waste stream, greater than expected quantities of plastics and 
homogeneous materials that forced drums into new waste streams, much less than expected 
radioactive material quantities in some drums, discovery of chemical compounds not identified 
in original AK documents, and the presence of reactive compounds that were originally reported 
as expended.   
 
Figure 2 shows a typical assemblage of material from an NTS legacy debris drum.  This 
particular drum was from LBL and contained reactive compounds that were unreported in the 
AK.  The reactive compound within a vial in this drum rapidly oxidized upon contact with air 
and initiated a small Class A fire involving the combustible wastes nearby in the glovebox. (Note 
the small scorch marks in the lower left of Figure 2.)  The CO2 fire suppression system within 
the glovebox quickly extinguished the flame with no injury or uptake to personnel and no 
damage or contamination of equipment.   
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Rejected and Rerun Drums  
Early on in the characterization process it was evident that the projected reject rate for drums of 
5 to 10 percent was too low and the actual rate would be 30 percent or higher. The lack of a 
comprehensive historical AK, and stringent controls during waste generation, contributed to the 
increase, although a waste generator in the 1970s could not have foreseen the stringent 
requirements for 21st century waste disposal.  This resulted in a large increase in the number of 
drums processed through the glovebox for PIR, or repackage to reposition radioactive material in 
a drum to reduce the surface exposure rate and change the classification of a drum from Remote-
Handled (not allowed for WIPP disposal under NTS certification) to Contact-Handled.  Rejected 
drums and containers were identified throughout the process from initial physical inspection 
through to development of the final loading manifest.   
 
 
Fig. 2.  Contents of legacy Lawrence Berkley Laboratory drum in the NTS VERB glovebox 
 
Project success was accomplished through the diligence, hard work, and innovation of the 
combined project personnel, as most of the drums for disposal at WIPP were successfully 
processed.  The downside is rework of these containers was very expensive and time-consuming.  
The NTS was left with a population of about 80 drums that could not go to WIPP and range from 
relatively easy disposition as low-level waste (LLW) or mixed low-level waste 
(MLLW) at the NTS to very difficult disposition as WIPP Remote-Handled TRU, high VOC 
TRU, or radioactive non-TRU waste that cannot be classified as LLW or MLLW.  In addition to 
these drums, 78 homogeneous solids drums are awaiting shipment offsite for sampling and 
certification prior to WIPP disposal.   
 
As shown in Figure 1, nearly 7,200 characterization actions were completed on a shipped 
quantity of 1,860 drums, or about 3.86 characterizations per drum.  Considering that every drum 
was required to go through HSGS, NDA, and either RTR or Visual Examination in lieu of RTR 
and including Visual Examination to confirm RTR, the minimum number of activities is around 
3.05 characterizations per drum, or about 5,700 characterizations.  The approximately 1,500 
additional activities are attributed to reruns of NDA and HSGS once the contents of a previously 
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characterized drum were altered through PIR or repackaging, pre-screening of drums through 
NDA (to allow more drums in each of the process areas than if the generator assumptions or 
early NDA data was used), and rerun of drums after a change in calibration, a change in 
acceptance criteria (NDA), or loss of data. 
 
Classified Material as TRU Waste  
Special considerations for characterization, transport, and disposal need to be made for materials 
that carry a security classification.  The NTS achieved a unique and innovative success in 
compliant, cost-effective disposal at WIPP of some of the classified inventory through the use of 
a waste declaration.  Not all classified materials are eligible for WIPP disposal.  These materials 
need to be identified early in the planning process, will require additional work controls, and are 
handled on a case-by-case basis by DOE. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The success of the effort is due to diligence, perseverance, knowledge, and hard work of 
dedicated personnel from the assembled team.  Integration and communication among 
NNSA/NSO, DOE/CBFO, BN, and various contractors under the CCP umbrella was essential.  
The process is intrinsically difficult and challenges arose throughout:  from preparing for the first 
deployment of CCP resources on site until the disposal of the final shipment at WIPP.  Attention 
to the challenges and experiences at the NTS will benefit SQSs using CCP to dispose of their 
TRU waste at WIPP. 
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